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Abstract
This paper studies sectoral eﬀects of ﬁscal spending. We estimate a New Keynesian model
with search and matching frictions and two sectors. Fiscal spending is either wasteful (con-
sumption) or productivity enhancing (investment). Using U.S. data we ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ences across sectors. Further, we show that government investment rather than consumption
shocks are driver of ﬂuctuations in sectoral and aggregate outputs and labor market variables.
Finally, government investment shocks are much more eﬀective in stimulating the economy than
spending shocks. However, this comes at the cost of a very persistent increase in debt.
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1 Introduction
During the Great Recession governments around the world used ﬁscal policy measures to counter
the large adverse eﬀects on real activity. Consecutively, the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy became a center
of attraction in macroeconomic research. However, academic research related to the sectoral (labor
market) eﬀects of ﬁscal policy is rather sparse. This is surprising as e.g. the famous Bernstein and
Romer (2009) report on the job market eﬀects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(ARRA, for short) breaks down job gains by Industry.
This paper closes this gap and analyzes the sectoral labor market eﬀects of ﬁscal spending and,
in particular, highlight the diﬀerences between government consumption and investment. We build
a stylized New Keynesian model of the U.S. economy with search and matching frictions and two
production sectors. One sector produces goods, while the other sector provides services. Monetary
policy in this model follows a Taylor-type interest rate rule. Fiscal policy can use its resources
(generated by lump-sum taxation) for government consumption or by building-up the government
capital stock. While government consumption is wasteful and works mainly as a demand-side
shock, government capital is used in the production process and aﬀects marginal productivity. We
want the reader to think about government capital as infrastructure which is an exogenous input
into the production process. The importance of government investments can be inferred from the
observation that roughly 30 percent of the 550 Billion U.S. Dollars in the ARRA was allocated to
infrastructure programs. We then estimate this model on U.S. time series using Bayesian methods.
Several ﬁndings stand out. The manufacturing labor market is characterized by a larger steady
state separation rate and a lower bargaining power compared to the service sector labor market.
In contrast, vacancy posting costs are almost ﬁve times larger in the service sector than in the
manufacturing sector. Further, government consumption and investment follow ﬁscal rule with
feedback to output but not to government debt. Government consumption reacts roughly three
times as much to variations in output than government investment.
A variance decomposition analysis shows that government investment plays a major role in
driving aggregate and sectoral output and inﬂation. Since we abstract from private capital our
results should be interpreted as an upper bound on the role of government investment. Employment
appears to be driven by the sectoral technology shocks and, for the manufacturing sector, the
aggregate technology shock. Monetary policy plays a minor role but seems to play a non-negligible
role in explaining movements in service sector employment.
Fiscal spending shocks increase sectoral and aggregate output. Unemployment decreases on
impact but increase in the medium-run. Sectoral diﬀerences are driven mainly by the diﬀerences
in the wage setting, diﬀerent vacancy posting costs, and diﬀerent separation rates. Overall, we ﬁnd
that investment shocks create larger real eﬀects than consumption shocks. However, they generate
a large increase in government debt that only slowly converges back to the steady state.
Our paper contributes to two streams in the literature. First, it contributes to the literature
that estimates search and matching models using Bayesian techniques. For the United States,
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Gertler et al. (2008), Lubik (2009), and Di Pace and Villa (2013) estimate search and matching
models. While Lubik (2009) estimates a stylized version of the search and matching model, Di Pace
and Villa (2013) use a richer model with capital and hours worked. Besides those papers there are
studies estimating search and matching models for other countries. Lubik (forthcoming) estimates
such a model for Hong Kong, Lin and Miyamoto (2012) use data for Japan, and Wesselbaum
(forthcoming) focuses on Australia.
Second, we add to literature on sectoral eﬀects of ﬁscal policy. However, the papers in this
category interpret sectoral as the diﬀerence between traded vs. non-traded goods and perform
their analysis in an open economy framework. Our analysis, in contrast, is performed in a closed
economy setting. Bénetrix and Lane (2010) perform a VAR analysis for a number of European
countries and ﬁnd that government spending increases the relative size of the non-traded vis-a-vis
the traded goods sector. They conclude that ﬁscal shocks do aﬀect the sectoral allocation while
having aggregate eﬀects. Along this line, Monacelli and Perotti (2008) use a structural VAR and
ﬁnd a positive comovement in consumption and production for the manufacturing and the service
sector in an open-economy model. They show that a canonical open-economy business cycle model
fails to generate such a positive comovement.
Further, Bouakez et al. (2013) estimate SVARs for subcategories of government spending and
investment. They ﬁnd large diﬀerences in the eﬀectiveness of ﬁscal policy across sectors. The
largest eﬀects are obtained for changes in government employment while spending has only limited
eﬀects on output.
Finally, our paper is related to the work by Obstbaum (2011), who builds a New Keynesian
search and matching model with ﬁscal policy. However, the main diﬀerence to our paper is that
ﬁscal spending is purely government consumption. One of the main ﬁndings is that the eﬀects on
labor market variables and output depends crucially on the ﬁnancing scheme.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops our model and section 3 presents our
data set and discusses our estimation results. Section 4 brieﬂy concludes.
2 Model Derivation
We develop a discrete-time model for the U.S. economy with two diﬀerent production sectors.
This model is an extension to the model developed in Wesselbaum (2011), while labor market
frictions follow the contributions from Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and den Haan et al. (2000).
Households maximize utility by setting the path of consumption, which is a CES aggregate of
diﬀerentiated products. Firms set prices and choose employment in two sectors: manufacturing
(i.e. goods production) and service and produce a ﬁnal good using both sectoral outputs. We
further assume that separations are endogenous and driven by job-speciﬁc productivity shocks.
Hence, there is a ﬂow of workers into unemployment while unemployment-employment transition
is subject to search and matching frictions.
Monetary policy sets the nominal interest rate via a standard Taylor-type interest rate rule and
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ﬁscal policy uses consumption and investment into government capital to spend resources.
2.1 Households
Our economy is populated by a family with two types of inﬁnitely-lived workers. They inelastically
supply one unit of labor and being represented by the unit interval. In addition, household members
insure each other against income ﬂuctuations as in Merz (1995). They have the following preferences
over consumption
Et
∞
t=0
βt [ln (Ct)] , (1)
where the conditional expectation operator is denoted by Et. Households discount the future with
a factor β ∈ (0, 1). The intertemporal budget constraint faced by the family is
Ct +
Bt+1
Pt+1
=Wxt Nt +Rt
Bt
Pt+1
+ but +Πt + Tt, (2)
where x ∈ m, s is the index for the worker’s sector, either m for manufacturing or s for service.
Further, but is income from unemployment with b > 0 corresponding to unemployment beneﬁts,
while Wxt Nt is labor income. Bond holding, Bt, pays a gross interest rate Rt, Πt are aggregate
proﬁts and Tt are lump sum transfers from the government.
Then, the optimality condition for the household is a standard Euler equation given by
1
Ct
= βEt

Rt
Pt
Pt+1
1
Ct+1

. (3)
2.2 Labor Markets
The ﬁrm searches for workers on two discrete and closed markets. This assumption is based upon the
limited ability of workers to switch sectors due to speciﬁc skills, initial education, and employment
protection legislation (see e.g. Lamo et al. (2006)).1 One of those market contains all workers in
the manufacturing sector, and the other contains all workers in the service sector. This assumption
allows us to account for diﬀerences in vacancy ﬁlling rates across sectors, found by Davis et al.
(2009) and estimate sectoral matching functions.2
New matchesMxt are created from the pool of unemployed U
x
t and the number of open vacancies
V xt according to the matching function
M(Uxt , V
x
t ) = m
x(Uxt )
µx(V xt )
1−µx , (4)
where µx ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment and the
match eﬃciency is governed by mx > 0. Then, the probability of a vacancy being ﬁlled in the next
period is q(θxt ) = m(θ
x
t )
−µ. Labor market tightness is given by θxt = V
x
t /U
x
t . Tightness is a key
variable in search and matching models as it generates a congestion externality: if a ﬁrm posts a
1See Davis (2001) and Davis and Haltiwanger (2001) for ex ante labor sorting into separate search markets.
2See also Tapp (2007) for this more general approach.
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vacancy it decreases simultaneously the probability for other ﬁrms to ﬁll a vacancy. On the other
hand, an additional searcher causes negative search externalities for other searchers, i.e. reduces
the job ﬁnding probability of all other searchers.
The ﬁrm’s exit site is characterized by endogenous separations. The total number of separations
in each sector, at ﬁrm i is given by ρx(a˜xit) = F (a˜
x
it), where a˜
x
it is the cut-oﬀ point of idiosyncratic
productivity and F (·) is a time-invariant distribution with positive support f(·). Its mean is given
by ωx and ςx is the dispersion of the function.
Connecting entry and exit site gives the evolution of employment at ﬁrm i as
Nxit+1 = (1− ρ
x
it+1)(N
x
it + V
x
it q(θ
x
t )). (5)
The ﬁrm has two margins to control employment: either adjust the number of posted vacancies or
set the critical threshold, which then inﬂuences the separation rate.
Finally, the aggregate values are deﬁned by
Uaggit = U
m
it + U
s
it, (6)
Maggit = M
m
it +M
s
it, (7)
V aggit = V
m
it + V
s
it, (8)
θaggit =
V aggit
Uaggit
. (9)
2.3 Firms
Firms use a standard Cobb-Douglas production technology with elasticity 0 ≤ ϑ ≤ 1
Yit = At (Y
m
it )
ϑ (Y sit)
1−ϑ , (10)
to produce the ﬁnal production good Yit using the output produced in the manufacturing sector
Y mit and the service sector Y
s
it.
The sector-speciﬁc production technologies are
Y xit =

Gkt
αx
AxtN
x
it

a˜x
it
ax
f(ax)
1− F (a˜xit)
dax ≡

Gkt
αx
AxtN
x
itH(a˜
x
it), (11)
where we use H(a˜xit) =

a˜x
it
ax f(a
x)
1−F (a˜x
it
)da
x to ease notation. Further, αx denotes the sector-speciﬁc
output elasticity w.r.t. government investment. The elasticity of government investment is a key
factor in discussing its eﬀectiveness. While aggregate productivity At and sectoral productivities Axt
are common to all ﬁrms, the speciﬁc idiosyncratic productivity axit is idiosyncratic and every period
it is drawn in advance of the production process from the corresponding distribution function.
Further, we assume that government capital is used in the production of sectoral outputs as the
ﬁnal good production only acts as an aggregation of sectoral outputs.
We assume that all three technology shocks follow autoregressive processes
lnAt = ρA lnAt−1 + eA,t, eA,t ∼ N (0, σA) , (12)
lnAxt = ρAx lnA
x
t−1 + eAx,t, eAx,t ∼ N (0, σAx) , (13)
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where the error terms are i.i.d. and normally distributed.
The ﬁrm maximizes the present value of real proﬁts given by
Πi0 = E0
∞
t=0
βt
λt
λ0

Pit
Pt
Yit −W
m
it −W
s
it − c
mV mit − c
sV sit −
ψ
2
	
Pit
Pit−1
− π

2
Yt

, (14)
while perfect capital markets imply that the ﬁrm discounts with the households subjective discount
factor β. The ﬁrst term in parenthesis is real revenue, the second and the third term is the wage
bill, which is given by the aggregate of individual wages
Wxit = N
x
it

a˜x
it
wxt (a
x)
f(ax)
1− F (a˜xit)
dax. (15)
The wage is not identical for all workers, instead it depends on the idiosyncratic productivity across
sectors. The fourth and ﬁfth term reﬂect the total costs of posting a vacancy. The latter term
corresponds to Rotemberg (1982) price adjustment costs. The degree of these costs is measured by
the parameter ψ ≥ 0, while the costs are related to the deviation from steady state inﬂation, π.
The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to employment, vacancies, and prices are
ξxt = ϕtA
x
tH(a˜
x
t )−
∂Wxt
∂Nxt
+ Etβt+1(1− ρ
x
t+1)ξ
x
t+1, (16)
cx
q(θxt )
= Etβt+1(1− ρ
x
t+1)ξ
x
t+1, (17)
ǫ(1− ϕt) = 1− ψ(πt − π)πt + Etβt+1

ψ(πt+1 − π)πt+1
Yt+1
Yt

. (18)
The current period average value of workers is given by ξxt and ϕt reﬂects real marginal costs.
Further, π denotes the steady state inﬂation rate. Combining (16) and (17) gives the job creation
condition
cx
q(θxt )
= Etβt+1(1− ρ
x
t+1)

ϕt+1A
x
t+1H(a˜
x
t+1)−
∂Wxt+1
∂Nxt+1
+
cx
q(θxt+1)

.
Hiring decisions are a trade-oﬀ between the cost of a vacancy and the expected return. The lower
the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, the longer the duration of existing contracts - as 1/q(θxt ) is the
duration of the relationship between ﬁrm and worker - because the ﬁrm is not able to replace the
worker instantaneously.
As an example, if expected productivity rises, the right-hand side rises while the left-hand side
on impact remains unchanged. Higher expected revenue creates incentives for the ﬁrm to post more
vacancies, which increases labor market tightness. Because the probability that an open vacancy
is ﬁlled is decreasing in the degree of labor market tightness the cost of posting vacancies increases
and reduces incentives to post new vacancies.
Finally, a log-linearization of the last ﬁrst-order condition around a zero inﬂation steady state gives
the New Keynesian Phillips curve
πˆt = βEtπˆt+1 + κϕˆt, (19)
where hats above variables denote deviations from steady state. The slope of the Phillips curve is
determined by κ = (ǫ− 1)/ψ.
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2.4 Wage Determination
Firm and worker engage in individual Nash bargaining and maximize the Nash product
wxt = argmax

(Ext − U
x
t )
η(J xt −Vt)
1−η

. (20)
The ﬁrst term is the worker‘s surplus, the latter term is the ﬁrm‘s surplus and 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the
exogenously determined, constant relative bargaining power. The worker’s threat point is Uxt , the
value of being unemployed and the ﬁrm’s threat points are given by Vt which is zero in equilibrium
due to a free entry condition. The asset value of a ﬁlled job for the ﬁrm is J xt and for the worker,
Ext , is the asset value of being employed.
Then, the solution to the problem is an optimality condition
Ext (a
x
t )− U
x
t =
η
1− η
J xt (a
x
t ). (21)
To obtain an explicit expression for the individual real wage we have to determine the asset values
and substitute them into the Nash bargaining solution. The three Bellman equations are given by
J xt (a
x
t ) = ϕtA
x
t a
x
t −w
x
t (a
x
t ) + Etβt+1

(1− ρxt+1)

a˜x
t+1
J xt+1(a
x)
f(ax)
1− F (a˜xt+1)
dax

, (22)
Ext (a
x
t ) = w
x
t (a
x
t ) + Etβt+1

(1− ρxt+1)

a˜x
t+1
Ext+1(a
x)
f(ax)
1− F (a˜xt+1)
dax + ρxt+1U
x
t+1

, (23)
Uxt = b+ Etβt+1

θxt q(θ
x
t )(1− ρ
x
t+1)

a˜x
t+1
Ext+1
f(ax)
1−F (a˜x
t+1
)da
x
+(1− θxt q(θ
x
t )(1− ρ
x
t+1))U
x
t+1

(24)
The ﬁrst equation is the asset value of the job for the ﬁrm depending on the real revenue, the real
wage and if the job is not destroyed, the discounted future value. Otherwise, the job is destroyed
and hence has zero value. The second equation is the asset value of being employed for the worker
and depends on real wage, the discounted continuation value, and in case of separation the value of
being unemployed. The latter equation is the asset value of being unemployed. Unemployed worker
receive unemployment beneﬁts, the discounted continuation value of being unemployed, and if she
is matched she receives the value of future employment. Finally, the expression for the wage is
wxt (a
x
t ) = η(ϕtA
x
t a
x
t + c
xθxt ) + (1− η)b. (25)
The gap between the real wage and the reservation wage is increasing in every time-dependent
component and the worker’s bargaining power.
At the end of this section we determine the cut-oﬀ point of idiosyncratic productivity. The ﬁrm
will endogenously separate from a worker if and only if
J xt (a
x
t ) < 0, (26)
i.e. if the asset value of the worker for the ﬁrm is negative. Using this condition, the expressions for
the real wage, and the vacancy posting condition in equilibrium yields the productivity threshold
a˜xt =
1
(1− η)ϕtA
x
t

(1− η)b+ ηcxθxt −
cx
q(θxt )

. (27)
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2.5 Monetary and Fiscal Policy
The monetary authority targets the nominal interest rate by following a standard Taylor rule, given
by
Rˆt = φππˆt + φyYˆt + e
r
t , (28)
where φπ > 0 and φy > 0 are the respective weights on inﬂation and output. Monetary policy
shocks ert follow an autoregressive processes
ln ert = ρr ln e
r
t−1 + er,t, er,t ∼ N (0, σr) , (29)
where the error terms are i.i.d. and normally distributed.
Fiscal policy ﬁnances expenditures with lump-sum taxes, Tt, and by issuing government bonds,
Bt,
Bt+1
Rt
= Bt +G
c
t + It − Tt. (30)
The government can uses its resources either for government consumption or for building up the
government capital stock.
Government consumption is wasteful and follows a ﬁscal rule with feedback to output and
government debt
Gct = −γcYt − λcBt +Gd,t, (31)
lnGd,t = ρG lnGd,t−1 + eGc,t, eGc,t ∼ N (0, σG) , (32)
where Gd,t are discretionary spending shocks with i.i.d. normally distributed errors. Here, γc gives
the weight of output and λc gives the weight of debt in the reaction function.
In contrast, government capital is used in the production process and follows
Gkt = (1− δ)G
k
t−1 + It−1, (33)
where δ > 0 is the depreciation rate of the capital stock and It−1 is the investment into new capital.
Here, we assume that there is a time-to-build lag following Kydland and Prescott (1982) and, more
recently, Bouakez et al. (2014).3 Again, we use a ﬁscal rule with feedback to output and government
debt to model government investment
It = −γkYt − λkBt + Id,t, (34)
ln Id,t = ρI ln Id,t−1 + eI,t, eI,t ∼ N (0, σI) , (35)
where discretionary investment spending are Id,t with i.i.d. normally distributed errors.
Finally, the resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + c
mV mit + c
sV sit +G
c
t + It +
ψ
2
(πt − 1)
2 Yt, (36)
such that the ﬁnal output good can be consumed by the private and the public sector, used as
vacancy posting costs in both sectors, or can be used to build up the government capital stock.
3We also tried a four-quarter lag and ﬁnd that our results are robust to this change.
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2.6 Calibration and Priors
We calibrate the model for the United States on a quarterly basis and present the prior choice for
the estimated parameters.
Households discount the future with β = 0.99, and the demand elasticity is set to 11.
The unemployment rates are taken from BLS household data. For the manufacturing sector we
take a value of 12 percent and for the service sector the unemployment rate is set to eight percent.
For both sectors, we assume that the idiosyncratic productivities are log-normally distributed with
zero mean and a variance of 0.12 as in Krause and Lubik (2007). The job ﬁlling rate in steady state
is set to 0.7 in line with Krause and Lubik (2007). The steady state cut-oﬀ point for idiosyncratic
productivity is given by a˜x = F−1(ρx). Then, matches in steady state are computed according
to Mx = ρ
x
1−ρxN
x, vacancies are given by V x = Mx/qx, and labor market tightness is tightness is
θx = V x/Ux. We can compute match eﬃciency as mx = qθµ
x
.
Government consumption is set to 25 percent of output and government investment is set to 5
percent of output in line with the values taken from the NIPA tables.
For the bargaining power of workers we assume a symmetric split and impose a normally
distributed prior with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.05. Further, the parameter that drives
the separation rates belongs to the beta family and has a mean of 0.1 and a standard deviation
of 0.02. Vacancy posting costs are assumed to be gamma distributed with mean 0.05 - as usually
assumed in the literature - with standard deviation 0.02. Finally, the elasticity of the matching
function is assumed to be beta distributed with mean of 0.5 and standard deviation 0.05.
The parameter ϑ in the aggregate production function is assumed to be normally distributed
with mean 0.5 and standard deviation 0.1. The sector-speciﬁc elasticities of government investment
are both normally distributed with mean 0.05 and standard deviation 0.05. Price adjustment costs,
ψ, are assumed to be normal distributed with mean 40 and standard deviation 5, based upon the
calibrated value by Krause and Lubik (2007).
The prior on the depreciation rate of government investment belongs to the beta family with
mean 0.02 and standard deviation of 0.01. The prior is set to the usually assumed value for private
capital in DSGE models. Then, we set the priors for the ﬁscal rule parameters. For the feedback
to output and debt we assume prior belonging to the gamma family with mean 0.1 and standard
deviation 0.1.
Monetary policy parameters are both assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 1.5
and standard deviation of 0.05 for the weight on inﬂation. For the weight on output, we assume
a mean of 0.125 with standard deviation 0.05. We assume that the autocorrelation parameters for
all six processes follow beta distributions, with mean of 0.5 and standard deviation of 0.2. Finally,
all standard deviations are inverse Gamma distributed, with mean of 0.1 and standard deviation 2.
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3 Estimation Results
3.1 Data
We use quarterly, seasonally adjusted time series for the United States from 1954:3 to 2013:4 (238
observations). Total output and the sectoral outputs are taken from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis’ NIPA tables. Total output is gross domestic product (A191RC1) in billions of U.S.
Dollars. Manufacturing output is the sum of durable (DDURRC1) and nondurable (DNDGRC1)
goods. Government consumption is the sum of current expenditures (W013RC) and capital transfer
payments (W020RC1) minus the consumption of ﬁxed capital (A918RC1). Government investment
is the sum of defense (A788RC1) and nondefense (A798RC1) gross investment plus state and local
gross investment (A799RC1). All variables are divided by the personal consumption expenditures
price deﬂator (DPCERG3), with basis year 2009.
Labor market variables are taken from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment in the man-
ufacturing sector is employment in the nondurable (CES3200000001) and durable (CES3100000001)
sector. Employment in the service sector is the sum of employment in the private service-providing
(CES080000001), professional and business service (CES6000000001), and other services (CES8000000001)
sector.
Finally, the interest rate is the eﬀective Federal funds rate taken from the St. Louis FED
FRED system. Before we run our estimation, we write the time series in logarithmic scale and use
a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with λ = 1600 to generate the cycle component. Then, we use 500.000
draws for our MCMC chains to obtain the estimation results.
3.2 Point Estimates
Table 1 presents the point estimates and the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals for the set of estimated
parameters.4
The separation rate in the manufacturing sector is larger compared to the service sector (0.09
vs. 0.06). They are sizably smaller compared to the value found by Lubik (2009) for the aggregate
separation rate of 0.12. The elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment
in the manufacturing sector is larger as in the service sector (0.59 vs. 0.48). The smaller value
in the service sector implies that i) the ﬁnding rate reacts more elastically to changes in labour
market tightness and ii) the matching rate is less sensitive to changes in labour market conditions.
However, those values are smaller compared to the estimated value in Lubik (2009) of 0.74. We
ﬁnd that workers in the service sector have a slightly smaller bargaining power compared to the
manufacturing sector (0.49 vs. 0.52). This implies a smalle share of the surplus in the service sector
is allocated to the worker. Next, we consider the cost of posting a vacancy. We ﬁnd that the cost
of posting a vacancy is slightly larger in the service sector (0.073) than in the manufacturing sector
(0.068). Usually, this parameter is calibrated at around 0.05 for standard (aggregate) matching
models, which seems to be a reasonable value given our estimates. The price adjustment cost
4Figures for the density are shown in the appendix.
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Table 1: Posterior estimates.
Parameter Point 5% 95% Parameter Point 5% 95%
δ 0.0143 0.0099 0.0201 αm 0.0302 0.0244 0.0373
ρm 0.0866 0.083 0.0906 φπ 1.5503 1.5392 1.5607
ρs 0.0568 0.0491 0.0633 φy 0.0819 0.0683 0.1003
ηm 0.5159 0.5003 0.5312 ρA 0.4444 0.4294 0.4635
ηs 0.4902 0.4808 0.5064 ρAm 0.7643 0.7116 0.8039
cm 0.0676 0.0646 0.0714 ρAs 0.8813 0.8046 0.9434
cs 0.0729 0.0697 0.077 ρG 0.8874 0.8353 0.924
µm 0.5864 0.5684 0.6056 ρI 0.5176 0.4844 0.5603
µs 0.4770 0.4659 0.4888 ρr 0.7162 0.6456 0.7899
γk 0.0162 0.0046 0.0249 σA 0.1105 0.0855 0.1366
γc 0.0014 0 0.0032 σAm 0.0213 0.0196 0.0231
λk 0.0624 0.0458 0.0794 σAs 0.0118 0.0118 0.0119
λc 0.0288 0.0148 0.0392 σG 0.0168 0.0153 0.0183
ψ 33.5075 32.8048 34.2674 σI 0.0222 0.0205 0.0240
α 0.4137 0.374 0.4381 σr 0.0518 0.0388 0.0664
αs 0.0522 0.036 0.0617
parameter is estimated to be 33.5, which is slightly smaller compared to the calibrated value in
Krause and Lubik (2007) which is set to match the Calvo probability of an average price duration
of four quarters. Hence, prices are re-set more frequently.
The depreciation rate of government investment is estimated to be 0.0143 which, intuitively,
is smaller compared to the depreciation of private capital usually assumed to be close to 0.025.
The elasticity of aggregate production function, ϑ, is estimated to be 0.41. This implies a larger
weight on service-sector output. The service-sector output elasticity w.r.t. government investment
is estimated to be 0.05, which is larger as in the manufacturing sector (0.03). Our results imply
that government investment is more productive in the service sector than in the manufacturing
sector. In the literature, the elasticity of government investment varies between 0.24 (Aschauer
(1989)) and negative values (Evans and Karras (1994)).
The ﬁscal rule describing government consumption reacts to government debt (0.03) but does
not respond to output, as zero is contained in the conﬁdence interval. In contrast, government
investment reacts to output (0.02) and debt (0.06). Since all parameters enter negatively into the
ﬁscal rules we ﬁnd a countercyclical behavior of government expenditures. Therefore, government
consumption and government investment can be interpreted as automatic stabilizers of real activity.
The weights in the monetary policy rule are in line with the literature. We ﬁnd a weight of 1.55 on
inﬂation and 0.08 on output which is slightly lower as commonly assumed (0.125).
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Figure 1: Estimated shocks. Vertical axis presents quarters from 1954 to 2010.
We ﬁnd that the sectoral technology shocks are highly autocorrelated in contrast to the ag-
gregate technology shock. Further, we ﬁnd that the government spending shock shows a larger
degree of autocorrelation compared to the government investment shock. The autocorrelation of
the monetary policy shock is midway between the two expenditure shocks.
Finally, we ﬁnd similar values for the standard deviations of all shocks, with the aggregate
technology shock and the monetary policy shock being the most volatile ones. Figure ?? presents
the time series of the estimated shocks.In conclusion, we ﬁnd evidence that sectors do behave
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. This holds for the exit as well for the entry side of job ﬂows.
3.3 Shock Decomposition
In this section we want to highlight the main driving forces of business cycle ﬂuctuations in key
aggregate and sectoral variables. Figure ?? presents the unconditional variance decomposition.
Our results show that output in both sectors is mainly driven by variations in aggregate tech-
nology. Further, manufacturing sector output is to 40 percent driven by the manufacturing sector
technology shock. In contrast, the service sector technology shock explains only about 30 percent
of total variation in service sector output. Innovations in monetary policy are more important for
service sector output than for output in the manufacturing sector output. Government expenditure
shocks explain less than ﬁve percent of sectoral outputs.
Variations in the inﬂation rate are to 60 percent driven by aggregate technology shocks. The
remaining variations are explained by the service sector technology and the monetary policy shock.
For the labor market, technology shocks play the dominant role. Variations in manufacturing
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Figure 2: Unconditional variance decomposition.
employment are driven by 60 percent by aggregate technology shocks and by 25 percent by tech-
nology shocks to manufacturing sector output. The remaining 15 percent are explained by shocks
to monetary policy and service sector output. In contrast, the main driving forces for service sector
employment are the aggregate technology shock and the monetary policy shock. Innovations to
service sector output explain only ﬁve percent of total variation.
3.4 Impulse Responses
Sectoral Technology Shocks
We begin with a positive, mean-reverting technology shock in the manufacturing sector as
shown in ﬁgure 3. This shock increases manufacturing sector output and reduces marginal costs
in this sector. Lower marginal costs - via the New Keynesian Phillips curve - imply lower prices
and inﬂation falls. The model generates a sectoral shift towards the manufacturing sector as
a consequence of higher relative productivity in this sector. While manufacturing sector output
increases, service sector output decreases. Nevertheless, the increase in manufacturing sector output
overcompensates reduced output in the service sector and aggregate output increases. Our ﬁndings
contrast the "average out" view of Lucas (1977) that sectoral reallocations should have only very
limited eﬀects on aggregate measures. This does not hold true in a sectoral model with labor
market frictions and sticky prices. As shown in Wesselbaum (2011) sticky prices are crucial to
obtain this result. They create an amplifying eﬀect in the manufacturing sector and through the
positive eﬀects of lower interest rates set by the monetary authority.
Those asymmetric eﬀects then spillover to the labor markets. Higher output leads to higher
employment in the manufacturing sector, while lower output leads to lower employment in the
13
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to an estimated technology shock in the manufacturing sector.
service sector. The technology shock increases the value of a match and leads ﬁrms to increase
the number of employees. Adjustments mainly occur along the exit side. Firms prefer to reduce
the number of separations then to post more vacancies. The reason is that reduced separations
are immediately eﬀective and are costless, while vacancies are costly and only become eﬀective in
the next period. The opposite eﬀects are obtained for the service sector labor market. To a large
extend, this is driven by much larger vacancy posting costs in the manufacturing sector than in the
service sector and the larger steady state separation rate in the manufacturing sector.
Higher output and lower inﬂation lead the monetary authority to lower the interest rate to
stimulate private consumption. Fiscal policy responds countercyclically and, hence, government
consumption and investment activities are reduced.
Turning to the service-sector technology shock we observe signiﬁcant diﬀerences. We ﬁnd that
the output responses are much more persistent compared to the manufacturing sector shock. Al-
though aggregate output does not increase as much as in the previous case, its persistence is much
higher. This is partly explained by the small adverse spillover eﬀects towards the manufacturing
sector. Manufacturing sector output does decrease but not as much as service sector output did
in the previous scenario. This does have eﬀects on the labor markets. Because the increase of
aggregate output is more persistent, unemployment decreases by more as the discounted, expected
proﬁts from an additional worker are larger. Further, this also explains the larger impact on real
wages, as workers have a larger bargaining power in the service sector.
Government Expenditure Shocks
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to an estimated technology shock in the service sector.
We begin with a positive, mean-reverting shock to government consumption. Figure 5 presents
the impulse response functions. First of all, we ﬁnd that the eﬀects, aggregate as well as sectoral, are
fairly small. Higher government consumption does increase aggregate and sectoral output through
the demand channel. Hump-shaped impulse responses show that the model generates a persistent
adjustment path towards the steady state. We ﬁnd symmetric eﬀects in both labor markets. Higher
demand creates an incentive for ﬁrms to increase employment and do so by reducing ﬁring. The
diﬀerences in vacancy posting costs and bargaining power across sectors leads to small diﬀerences
in the reaction of the two sectors. We ﬁnd that the service sector reacts more strongly to the
consumption shock, which is mainly driven by the stronger reaction in real wages.
Finally, we want to discuss the response of our model to a positive and mean-reverting increase
in government investment as shown in ﬁgure 6. Compared to the government consumption shock
we ﬁnd much larger reactions in all variables. As before, we ﬁnd that the shock creates symmetric
eﬀects for the sectors and leads to stronger reactions in the service sector. Aggregate as well as
sectoral outputs are increased and show a persistent convergence towards the steady state. As the
government investment shock is a supply-side shock, i.e. a diﬀerent type of technology shock, the
strong reaction of output is not surprising. Then, higher output due to higher productivity leads to
lower marginal costs and lower prices. Inﬂation falls which leads the monetary authority to lower
interest rates. This creates additional positive eﬀects on private consumption. Hence, the increase of
output can not only be met by increased government investment such that the ﬁrm reduces ﬁring to
increase employment. Over time, this eﬀect needs to be revised and ﬁrms start lay-oﬀ more workers
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to an estimated government consumption shock.
such that unemployment increase in the medium-run. Again, due to the diﬀerent structural labor
market parameters, the reaction in the service sector is larger compared to the manufacturing
sector. Finally, we ﬁnd that the ﬁscal rules imply a decrease in government consumption but, as
the increase in investment is larger than the drop in consumption, debt increases.
We can conclude that government investment is far more eﬀective in increasing aggregate and
sectoral output levels than government consumption. However, this also comes at a cost: govern-
ment investment leads to increased unemployment over the medium-run after an initial drop in the
unemployment rate. Further, government debt increases sizably. Both observations are not present
for government consumption shock.
4 Conclusion
The Great Recession has rescuscitated the interest in the eﬀects of ﬁscal policy to counter adverse
eﬀects on output and labor markets. However, academic research related to the sectoral (labor
market) eﬀects of ﬁscal policy is rather sparse.
This paper closes this gap and estimates a New Keynesian model with search and matching
frictions and two sectors. Fiscal policy can use its resources for government consumption or for
government investment. While government consumption is wasteful and works mainly as a demand-
side shock, government capital is used in the production process and aﬀects marginal productivity.
Fiscal policy is determined by ﬁscal rules with endogenous feedback to output and debt, allowing
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Figure 6: Impulse responses to an estimated government investment shock.
for discretionary interventions. Then, the model is estimated on U.S. time series using Bayesian
methods.
We ﬁnd several interesting results. Compared to the service sector, the manufacturing sector
labor market has higher job ﬂows in steady state and workers have a lower bargaining power.
Further, vacancy posting costs are roughly ﬁve times lower. Government debt has no signiﬁcant
impact on ﬁscal spending. Government consumption and investment respond solely to movements
in output, i.e. are automatic stabilizers. Government consumption reacts roughly three times as
much to variations in output than government investment.
Business cycle ﬂuctuations of sectoral and aggregate output as well as the inﬂation rate are
mainly driven by government investment shock. This ﬁnding is likely to be biased due to the
absence of private capital. Employment appears to be driven by the sectoral technology shocks
and, for the manufacturing sector, the aggregate technology shock.
Both types of ﬁscal spending shocks lead to an increase in sectoral and aggregate output. For
the labor market, unemployment decreases on impact but increase in the medium-run. Overall,
we ﬁnd that investment shocks create larger real eﬀects than consumption shocks. However, they
generate a large increase in government debt that only slowly converges back to the steady state.
Future research will take into account private capital dynamics and a more detailed description
of ﬁscal ﬁnancing.
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